The Redistricting Crisis: How Gerrymandering Is Being Used to Steal the US Congress
Paul R. Miller
October 6, 2021
Revised November 1, 2021
The present paper is the result of an in-depth analysis of gerrymandering of US congressional districts in all states which redistrict after the decennial census. I argue that in the last decade, gerrymandering has favored Democratic Party candidates almost exclusively, providing an unfair advantage in congressional races which are then secured through election fraud to give the Democratic Party a majority in the US House of Representatives. I show that the Democrats have already stolen between 24 and 43 congressional seats and that they intend to steal as many as 24 more by manipulating the courts into overstepping their constitutional roles through the selective application of an invalid argument. I provide a statistical analysis to demonstrate how this is done, a comprehensive list of which districts have been stolen in this manner, an objective measure of the extent of gerrymandering in each state, and proposed solutions to the problem of gerrymandering as it currently exists in America.
The common misconception about gerrymandering
There are essentially two types of political gerrymandering in common practice: widening the margin of the voting demographics in a certain district or precinct to favor one party, thereby reducing that district’s competitiveness, and unfairly increasing the number of legislative seats a party can win in any given election. Each of these types of gerrymandering has been used and met with significant legal challenges in American politics since the 19th Century. Currently we are witnessing the emergence of a third type, which is to circumvent the legislative role in redistricting altogether. A contemporary example of this is the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s self-appointed role in not only arbitrating a dispute between litigants, which is common, but in ignoring the constitutional prerogative of the state’s legislature and actually drawing up a congressional districts map for that state.
The first type of gerrymander is used to facilitate the second type, but its utility to this end is actually scant. The thinking is that putting all of the minority party’s voters into the smallest number of districts possible will enable the majority party to come away with as many seats as possible. In an election with narrow differences in the voting patterns, this could theoretically secure the majority party’s chances of winning more seats overall, but it would be naïve to think that the extra advantage could necessarily overcome the differences between the individual candidates in a race, or other factors such as the amounts of monies raised and spent on campaigns, election fraud, or how the voters feel about certain issues at the time.
Whereas Republican voters are fairly well dispersed among rural and suburban geographical areas, Democrats clearly have the upper hand in many high-population density urban areas, so that unlike Republicans, they are already both pigeonholed and protected against dilution by apportionment. This makes it difficult for Republican gerrymandering efforts to succeed in diluting the opposing party’s voting bloc, though it is relatively easy for Democrats to do the same. The reason for this is that heavily-Republican political units do not contain the populations which the larger cities do, and are therefore more easily sliced up and added to whatever district on the whim of whatever legislative assembly.
Gerrymandering is specifically the unfair advantage which a party can gain for itself by manipulating the districts map, not whatever advantage it has based on any distribution of votes or even an attempt to manipulate it. While allegations of gerrymandering are routine, to date, the legal case against it has not been compelling except where legitimate complaints under the Voting Rights Act have been upheld in court.
This presents a conundrum to the people tasked with drawing districts maps, especially in red states. If Republicans were to dilute Democrat votes by splitting a large city with a large ethnic minority population into several districts, they would be accused, fairly, of dividing communities of interest, a fact which, based on racial demography, could be interpreted as a violation of the Voting Rights Act. Yet if they do not split them, Democrats will automatically accuse them of gerrymandering; it’s gerrymandering if they do it and it’s gerrymandering if they don’t, but at least it’s not racist. In this way, Democrats have eliminated the incentive for Republicans not to gerrymander by playing the spurious racism card at every opportunity, and they do fall back on appeals to the Voting Rights Act as a matter of routine in contesting district lines drawn by Republicans.
The legal distinction between what is a fair advantage and what is an unfair advantage is very important, because the expectation of what happens when states do not gerrymander is very different from the reality. Democrats’ arguments are typically predicated on the mistaken or feigned belief that they are victims and their cause is just, so that they will benefit from remedial action. And while there is no doubt that Republicans resorted to gerrymandering in the past, the routine allegation is presently without substance, as the process does not actually work the way everyone thinks it does.
For many Democrats, the accusation is just an excuse for their disadvantage in a competitive state or district. As Ohio House Representative Jessica Miranda described it, the Republicans’ state map in Ohio is “almost the definition of gerrymandering” (Balmert, 2021), but when pressed, neither she nor anyone litigating against the Ohio Redistricting Commission over its map can offer a concise definition of what gerrymandering entails, or cite a single valid reason why Ohio’s state assembly map is actually unconstitutional, as they explicitly allege and claim to support with their arguments. I have asked them to do either, but have never received a response. In fact, the closest thing I have seen to an attempt at a valid argument is an oblique reference to the irregular appearance of a district’s shape on a map.
“It’s easy to draw districts that have strange shapes in the effort to equalize populations across districts,” says Professor James Gimpel of the University of Maryland’s Department of Government and Politics. “There are some very strangely-shaped districts that were not drawn that way for partisan reasons. I would hope that people would be less in a rush to judge these oddly-shaped districts as being partisan gerrymandering, because that’s not true much of the time” (Ordway, 2021).
Take Louisiana’s second US congressional district, for instance, shown here in green:
To the untrained eye, this sprawling district which votes almost 75% Democrat may seem to be gerrymandered. However, the aesthetic form is the result of several criteria which may not be immediately apparent from a casual glance. For one thing, the population distribution is informed by the geographical landscape of the Mississippi Delta. This district’s northern or western end encompasses the inner city of Baton Rouge which is 55% African-American, and the southern or eastern end encompasses most of New Orleans which is 57% African-American. As the respective populations of Baton Rouge and New Orleans are predominantly Democrat but the surrounding areas are solid Republican, the legislators could dilute the Democrat votes in these cities by carving out competitive districts, but to do so would be to actually violate the intent of federal legislation. This district, which altogether is 58.6% African-American, is Louisiana’s only majority-minority district, the existence of which is justified under the Voting Rights Act, as the combined population of these two nearby cities is more than a congressional district apportionment. Therefore, Louisiana’s District 2 is the result of certain legal requirements, and its aesthetic form as depicted on a map is not representative of a district which has been unconstitutionally gerrymandered.
No state has received more criticism over gerrymandering than Ohio has, owing largely to the appearance of its 4th “Duck” and 9th “Snake on the Lake” Districts. It has therefore become the principle battleground in the political fight over redistricting in America, as the allegation of gerrymandering has become so often repeated that no one even contests its veracity. Yet, as I will show by way of empirical reasoning, Ohio is actually one of the states which cannot reasonably said to be gerrymandered.
What Ohio Democrats call “fairness” when they demand remediation is simply the tyranny of the minority, as they would have a state with only one city of over 1 million people dictate public policy to the state’s other 10 million residents. The obligation of Ohio’s General Assembly to the voters is not to hand power over to the Democrats because they demand it, but to prevent them from seizing power without first having the mandate to do so from the ballot box. If we the people of Ohio had wanted to give the Democrats extra congressional seats, then we would have voted for Democrats at the state level in the last elections so that they could draw the map however they liked. As it is, what we voted for (present author included) was not to put an end to the Republican legislators’ careers, but to gerrymandering. And gerrymandering is not a matter of the appearance of a district on a map, or of giving the majority of voters the clear majority of representation in their government, but of disenfranchising real people by denying them such representation through subversion of the constitutional process of redistricting.
Gerrymandering as integral to the Democrats’ strategy for stealing elections
The Democrats’ brazen theft of the US presidency in 2020 made the whole world aware that they have no interest in free and fair elections, nor in fostering confidence in our electoral process. However the mainstream media wish to spin it and gaslight the public, the fact that they stole the election from Donald Trump and from the people who voted for him is neither a secret nor a fringe conspiracy theory. Swing states that were rigged for Joe Biden stopped their counts without any valid reason or explanation in the middle of the night. Ballots around the country were illegally harvested days after the election in plain view of the public. Voters in red precincts were given sharpies to invalidate their ballots. We all know the election was illegitimate because we all saw it happen.
Within 4 days of the 2020 US presidential election, I had compiled concrete evidence documenting 36 different types of election fraud issues which in total point to a deliberate and concerted nationwide effort to rig the election for Democrats (Miller, 2020). Since then, I have discovered other means of election interference which are often harder to document. Mostly these issues are for the states to resolve if they are to inspire confidence in future elections and avert civil catastrophe, which is what forensic election audits are for. However, audits are selective and reactionary and do not even begin to address the real problem of how elections are actually rigged. The smoking gun evidence that auditors are looking for is in front of everyone, but no one is looking at it because it is the forest and they are looking at the trees.
The reason no one with an interest has found it yet is that they are viewing gerrymandering the way I have described it here, with the popular misconception, rather than reverse engineering the process by way of statistical inference. Also, gerrymandering has changed dramatically over the last two decades with the emergence of the third type which I have described—that of subverting the legislative process altogether. Some academics, however, are starting to catch on; Gimpel et al. (2021) analyzed data concerning redistricting litigation from 1960 to 2019 and concluded the following:
As for longer term trends in case filings, the most notable result is the recent increase in federal partisan gerrymandering cases, as this litigation has evolved considerably after 2000. There is no evidence in these data, however, that state partisan gerrymandering cases are also on the rise, though this could certainly change after 2021. Certainly, over the longer span of time, redistricting complaints in state courts have diminished as the federal courts have assumed a more activist role. (p. 12)
This was published August 11. By the end of September there were already three separate lawsuits challenging Ohio’s state assembly map, beginning with a 309-page brief filed just days after the map was adopted. Compare that with a 2006 Pew poll which found that 89% of Americans had heard “nothing at all” about the gerrymandering debate and did not care to (Rosentiel, 2006). So the authors have evidently underestimated the Democrats’ premeditated intent to use the courts and fabricated popular opinion to subvert the legislature, as well as their level of cooperation and coordination to this end as an overall political strategy. Yet they were able to anticipate it from recent trends:
In politically divided states, plaintiffs have a greater incentive to complain about even the most modest irregularities they might find in the opposing party’s maps. … In some circumstances, plaintiffs might believe that it is easier to seek to change the balance of power through a court ruling than it would be to change it through the more standard process of biennial and quadrennial elections. (p. 13)
As we will see, this is not merely a matter of political opportunism, but of unconstitutional gerrymandering under the guise of fixing the problem of unconstitutional gerrymandering. As for the question of why the strategy of manipulating the courts has been adopted by the minority party in certain swing states, the authors hint that the common justifications of Voting Rights Act violation allegations and the argument for proportional representation are phony legal arguments which provide cover for the real purpose of seeking partisan political advantage:
The sizes of the gaps between the seat percentage and vote percentage, either for seats in Congress or the state legislature, are not as relevant to case origination as simply the competitive balance of the parties vying for office. This is surprising, perhaps, given that in very recent litigation, disproportionality has been a major focus of the cases objecting to partisan gerrymandering. Our data suggest that this development is too new to be a major driver of redistricting case law over the longer span of time. One explanation for this is that justices on the U.S. Supreme Court only in the last two decades have appeared open to challenges to redistricting plans on the basis of partisan unfairness. Perhaps future redistricting cycles will see more challenges in states where seat shares do not reflect vote shares. (p. 13)
Again, the authors are mistaken because they assume no intent; the rise of cases based on disproportionality is evidence of such intent. It is not at all surprising if it is understood as integral to the Democrats’ overall strategy for stealing elections, and that it was adopted largely in response to the battle for the White House in 2000 which was settled in the state of Florida, where both parties were relying on fraud to secure the victory, and the losing side realized it needed to innovate. The US Supreme Court decided to step in because, at the time, the majority of justices were judicial activists enlisted to push the partisan political agenda. This much, at least, is understood by the authors:
That case filings appear to follow a logic involving not just the presence of major stakeholders but also one that tracks closely the balance of political power should not come a shocking surprise. It is a reminder that courts are seen by others as political institutions, even if they do not view themselves that way. (p. 13)
Election fraud is certainly a problem in Florida where this strategy was initially conceived, but it is difficult to discern to what extent. After all, presidential elections are different from congressional elections where district lines and voting demographics are the most important factors in election outcomes. So the possibility of gerrymandering in heavy-Democrat urban areas discussed in the previous section can be outcome-determinative in multiple districts in a state the size of Florida. For example, Broward County, where Brenda Snipes was Supervisor of Elections from 2003 until she was removed in 2018 over her malfeasance, has portions of 4 separate congressional districts within it, and each of these seats is held by a Democrat. And we know that Snipes rigged the 2016 primary for Debbie Wasserman Schultz who was Chair of the DNC until she was ousted for rigging the Democratic primary against Bernie Sanders, because she admitted to destroying the ballots (Friesdat, 2017).
While election fraud is certainly used to tip the scales in favor of one candidate or another in a race, the bigger problem of election security is the selective efforts by Democrats to circumvent the constitutional prerogative of state legislatures to draw district lines. The argument was put to referendum in 2010 under the “Fair District Amendments” to the state’s constitution. The referendum passed with more than 63% of the vote because Democrats voted how they were told while Republican voters generally want fair districts and did not know any better. In hindsight, the same voters now understand that Democrats do not want fairness, but to steal elections.
The referendum initiative was led by the League of Women Voters, an NGO which advocates radical progressive policies and opposes election integrity laws, and with the help of the leftist think tank Common Cause which gave the initiative an appearance of bipartisanship. (Common Cause pretends to be nonpartisan but openly advocates the abolition of the Electoral College and opposes an Article V convention of states, which it justifies by noting that the majority of states are controlled by Republican legislatures, even though that argument is irrelevant to the question of constitutional amendments because the GOP lacks a supermajority among the state legislatures.) When the amendments passed, the League of Women Voters turned its attention to challenging the state of Florida’s new 2012 districts map.
The Democrats enlisted an activist judge named Terry Lewis who had distinguished himself by overseeing the 2000 presidential election recount. Lewis ruled in 2014 that the Republicans’ 2012 districts map was unconstitutional based on the misconception described in the Section I so that the Democrats could take Districts 5 and 10. The following year, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that all but three districts held securely by Republicans be redrawn and approved the League’s plan to gerrymander the state in favor of the Democrats. While Republicans still control two of the districts gerrymandered to give the Democrats advantages there, the Democrats were able to narrow the margin to only one seat in 2018, having started with a difference of 19 to 6 in 2012. The Democrats’ success at using the courts to siphon off a congressional seat in the first election following the Supreme Court case caused them to realize that replicating this feat in other red states was their best option for taking the House of Representatives once and for all.
These courts’ rulings were based on the as-yet unopposed argument alleging gerrymandering based on the Democrats’ notion of proportional representation. Although there was nothing illegal or unconstitutional about it, the state supreme court cited the fact that a certain political operative was acquainted with the former state house speaker as evidence of subversive intent. The court therefore reasoned that because the legislature could not be trusted, it was not entitled to its constitutional prerogative, and therefore overturned the lower court’s ruling that it should provide a remedial districting plan in favor of the plaintiffs’ plan, which was so poorly conceived that even Democrats cited it as violating the Voting Rights Act. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs went on to file other lawsuits to challenge the state maps.
Common Cause also filed a suit in North Carolina in 2016 to the same end, but unlike the League of Women Voters, is also challenging the heavily-Democrat state of Maryland based on the argument for proportional representation. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals initially determined that two of North Carolina’s districts needed to be redrawn in 2016, and the state’s map was declared a partisan gerrymander in 2018, but the US Supreme Court ruled in 2019 that partisan gerrymandering is a political question, in effect ordering the federal courts to stay out of it. Then, the same year, the judgment in Common Cause v. Representative David R Lewis, et al. ordered the state assembly to draw new state map lines without consideration to election results data, and that the map drawing process be more transparent, entailing public hearings and public observation. The congressional map was similarly thrown out; as a result, the Democrats were able to pick up 2 more congressional districts.
While all of these rulings were still within the bounds of fairness, the Democrats’ strategy of taking the US House of Representatives once and for all could not be accomplished through a fair process, and they knew it. In 2018, not even 3 years after the initial US Supreme Court ruling which carved up the Florida districts map for the Democrats, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania along party lines that the state assembly’s map was an unconstitutional and a partisan gerrymander based on the proportional vote argument. The GOP-controlled legislature and the corrupt Democrat governor could not agree on a new map, so the court took it upon itself to draw its own remedial map, which was no remedial map at all, but a partisan gerrymander favoring the Democrats. It was supposed to favor Republicans by a 10 to 8 margin, from an original 13 to 5, but the Republicans wound up losing 4 seats altogether due to rampant election fraud in Districts 8 and 17. Perhaps worse than this is that the state supreme court ignored all kinds of objective metrics for determining fairness and adopted a map drawn by a liberal professor of law based in California.
By then the new strategy to upend elections had garnered the attention of big-money institutions including the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Democratic Redistricting Committee which had eyes on the other Rust Belt states. In particular, the League of Women Voters and the ACLU challenged Ohio’s 2011 congressional map 7 years after the fact, based on the expectation that a constitutional amendment like the one in Florida would give the Democrats a legal premise to challenge Ohio’s state and congressional districts even though Republicans had a trifecta. As in Florida, voters failed to see through it because of how the “reform” was packaged, and the referendum which had the support of a large percentage of the GOP lawmakers passed by a margin of 3 to 1.
It is not enough for the Democrats to score a victory in acquiring a court order to redraw a few districts, as they did in Florida. They want to completely undermine the process by forcing their own maps through the courts as the minority party, as they did in Pennsylvania. In Ohio, the League of Women Voters offered this congressional map as a remedial plan as part of their 2018 lawsuit:
Notice that this map is not really compact—one of the constitutional criteria—as Districts 4 and 15 sprawl all the way from opposite corners of the state and connect in the middle, because the intent is to disenfranchise the voters in these districts, specifically, by diluting the votes of rural whites who happen to largely vote Republican. In fact, so little concern is given to the residents of Appalachia that it is divided into three separate districts without any clear geographical logic. I posit that rural Christians in Ohio who are already the most impoverished, the most afflicted by the opioid epidemic, and easily one the most underprivileged and underrepresented communities of interest in America, have been intentionally marginalized the way the Democrats’ professional victims claim they are—that it is a blatant affront to the same Equal Protection Clause which they cite in their arguments.
But this is merely an afterthought to the main intent. The focus of the League’s map is on creating two Democrat seats out of Columbus and flipping Hamilton County for the Democrats, although there is no clear reason why Hamilton County must be divided the way they have divided it, even with the constitutional amendment aimed at forcing it, unless we assume they are trying to dilute the Republican votes in the Cincinnati suburbs.
Before the Senate Democrats presented their map at the end of September, Democrats in Ohio had presented several other maps which did not meet the constitutional criteria as well, and which show an overall pattern of the intent to steal congressional seats via their proportional representation argument, since no one in his right mind will argue that the state of Ohio actively engages in racially-biased voter suppression efforts, which was the actual nature of the controversy which the Voting Rights Act settled. That the League of Women Voters was behind the iterations prior to the Senate Democrats’ map is evident, for example, in the Lauren Karch (2021) map. Notice that Karch has not made substantial changes to Districts 4 and 15, despite Ohio’s loss of a seat.
It should be noted that Ms. Karch’s map fails nearly all of the constitutional criteria and uses inaccurate precinct and population data (perhaps because she did not have the census data available when she created it), so that there are minor discrepancies. However, I have attempted to recreate her map using the Dave’s Redistricting App (DRA 2020) as faithfully to her intent as I could in order to uncover the population and voting demographics data for the sake of the present argument. I present it here to show that I have indeed been faithful to this end, as this is important for my statistical analysis.
I have chosen Ms. Karch’s map because it is representative of the Democrats’ involvement in the redistricting of Ohio. Based on the statistical models which I will elaborate on, Karch’s intent was evidently to give Democrats extra congressional seats by manipulating the map to provide them slim margins, which stand out as statistically anomalous in the data sets. The result is that Democrats are projected by previous election data to control 7 seats instead of the present 4 and despite that Ohio loses 1 overall. After thorough examinations, I have concluded that little consideration seems to be given to anything else. The Senate Democrats’ map, however, evidently aims at meeting the constitutional criteria other than the fact that is a partisan gerrymander of undisclosed origin.
As with Karch and the League of Women Voters, my analysis shows that the Ohio Senate Democrats want 7 congressional seats in Ohio. That is, the Democratic Party in Ohio is currently attempting an unconstitutional gerrymander in Ohio surpassing even the precedent in Pennsylvania which is not even a red state like Ohio is. But since the courts which settle these disputes have shown themselves completely oblivious to the nature of the problem and instead opt to determine whether a map is a partisan gerrymander based on a quick look at its aesthetic form and a constitutionally invalid argument of proportional representation, the Democrats’ map is likely to be the remedial map chosen by the Supreme Court of Ohio since it looks how they have come to expect it to—especially since the Democrats are targeting Republican justices for recusal. However, the battle for Ohio is not yet over.
It is important to understand that, as the Framers of the US Constitution intended that politicians at the state level would determine how the districts would be apportioned, there is a great deal of flexibility, if not implicit allowance for legislators to seek political advantage in the nation’s legal framework, so that the party in control is theoretically allowed to manipulate the map in its own interest to whatever degree that it does not infringe on the rights protected by the Constitution. This should not be confused with gerrymandering, which is an unfair advantage, such as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause or the “one person, one vote” clause would constitute, as election fraud does.
The Democrats who illegally drew and implemented the congressional map of Pennsylvania gerrymandered 4 districts to be within 6 points, and 5 within 7, in order to give as many districts as they could to the Democrats. While it should be self-evident in Ohio’s case, we can expect the smoking gun evidencing the truth of the allegation to be what we find in Pennsylvania, which is not a tendency toward the statewide average of the vote distribution, but more seats going to the minority party, with several proposed districts being well below the statewide average and simultaneously favoring them. Also, as Pennsylvania has more Democrat voters than Republican, any attempt at replicating the gerrymander here in Ohio should be even more obvious. The objective litmus for detecting gerrymandering, as I will explain, is statistical variance.
As shown below, there is no discernable difference in the measures of variance between the League of Women Voters-inspired Karch map and the Senate Democrats’ map. The variance from the values submitted with the Democrats’ map is 821.2246, a 21.6% increase from the existing map’s 675.3115. That is, the Democrats’ map is about 22% more gerrymandered than the one they are saying is unconstitutional on account of being gerrymandered. (Note: The utility of each of the graphs below will be explained later.)
The Democrats’ intent to gerrymander is further demonstrated by the failure of a histogram of the probabilities of the voting margins by party to resemble something approximating a normal distribution curve, and by the fact that the Democrat districts created by diluting Republican votes is even more evident in their map than it is in the Karch map.
Now, here is the map which I have proposed and submitted to the Ohio Redistricting Commission, which strictly follows all of the constitutional guidelines:
The statistical differences between my non-gerrymandered map with the Democrats’ gerrymandered map will be discussed later. For now, it bears mentioning that one of the oft-overlooked constitutional criteria both for Ohio and for other states which have implemented similar gerrymandering restrictions is that districts are not be drawn to favor or disfavor not just any party, but any incumbent, as well. Yet the Democrats’ map is designed to disfavor both the GOP and their incumbents by ensuring that they be pitted against each other in the primaries and then lose in the general election. Specifically, Congressmen Chabot and Wenstrup have been placed in the same Democrat district, as have Johnson and Balderson in another, and Latta and Davidson in another. Nor can we chalk it up to accident, as the same cannot be said for the Democrat incumbents. On the other hand, I designed my map to meet all the criteria including this one, and have given each incumbent of either party who is running for re-election his or her own district, although it was not convenient and effects how compact the districts can be. More to the point, if the old District 4 is a “duck,” then so is the Democrats’ new District 11, and the Snake on the Lake is still a snake, even if it has been divided into two districts which now extend further to the east, including all of Geauga County. Even if the Democrats really intended to produce a map that does not have the appearance of being gerrymandered because appearance is the only way they know how to detect it, they still failed.
The Democrats’ mantra of doing the right thing and being accountable to voters does not just mean adopting a map which puts an end to gerrymandering; it means the Democrats will have to fight to retain anything more than the two seats in Columbus and Cleveland which a fair map entitles them to. Although they clearly did not understand this going into it because they got away with their shenanigans in Florida and Pennsylvania, that is the fair result of the changes they promoted and which have become law. Anything short of it constitutes an unlawful gerrymander for the minority party, which redistricting commissions and state assemblies have the obligation to avoid.
But lest we think this all happened by accident, the Democrats have shown their hand by inventing yet another means of unconstitutional gerrymandering: the ranked-choice voting system which gave them Maine’s 2nd congressional district. This district should be securely Republican, as the second-most white and second-most rural district in the nation. However, the Democrats succeeded in getting a candidate elected in this district in 2018 through the nation’s first-ever ranked-choice voting election, whereby an incumbent was defeated for the first time in this district since 1916. Essentially, the Democrats flooded the field with independent candidates in order to ensure that the Democrat would get the most alternative votes, so that the steal by a fraudulent ballot count would seem more plausible, as the method had never been tried before, so people did not really know what to expect other than that the incumbent would get the most first-choice votes, which he did. Officially, the Democrat candidate lost the first-place vote by 2171 (0.75%) and won overall by 3509 (1.24%). Now that he is the incumbent, the ranked-choice vote is not being used, as the incumbent in this district always wins and the system is therefore no longer needed to rig it for his party.
As the ranked-choice method was used successfully in a heavily-Republican district in Maine and there has been little attention to its use or contestation of the result, we can be certain that the Democrats will try to use it strategically in races they cannot otherwise steal without the appearance of election fraud.
The Democrats’ proportional representation argument
While the proportional representation argument has no legal merit on constitutional grounds, it does need to be addressed, as it has become the basis for the new crop of judicial judgments unduly favoring Democrats. It was ostensibly the main consideration in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision to award the task of drawing that state’s districts to a law professor in lieu of someone more competent or qualified. But as it is a question of statistics, it bears mentioning that neither the litigants nor the courts have even bothered to consult the real experts on the subject before rendering judgment, which is to say, anyone competent at making statistical inferences. After all, no one can make a valid argument that the minority party deserves more representation than it earns at the ballot box based on the so-called popular vote without referencing numbers and other empirical data demonstrating exceptions to the rule that they are otherwise entitled to nothing, because our system is not one of proportional representation as the parliaments of Europe are. In no sense whatsoever did the Founding Fathers intend that any election or any representation in government be by anything other than plurality. Yet that is becoming the norm due to the Democrats’ replication of the subversion employed in Florida and Pennsylvania.
Recall the necessity of Louisiana’s 2nd congressional district as a majority-minority district, per federal legislation aimed at protecting African-Americans’ rights to representation. The other 5 (or 83%) of Louisiana’s 6 congressional districts are solid red, with margins of more than 30% favoring Republicans on average. Based on the DRA 2020 data, the statewide margins favoring Republicans in the last two presidential elections were 19.7 and 18.6, respectively, and the mean congressional margin in that time is 18.5. As Republicans are able to get in the vicinity of 58% of the votes in a general election, they control 83% of the congressional districts. This is not a privilege or entitlement by gerrymander, but a statistical observation. However, the argument for proportional representation assumes that the minority party in Louisiana should have 2 or even 3 districts, but achieving this would be not only illegal but also nearly impossible, as there are not enough Democrat votes in Louisiana to dilute them to the point that they would pick up that many seats. This is simply the reality of a system of majority rule, and any attempt to subvert it would constitute an unconstitutional gerrymander.
The same axiom holds as true in other states as it does in Louisiana: A portion of the vote across the state does not entitle a particular party to control of a similar portion of the available seats. Connecticut, which only went 53% for Hillary Clinton—less than Ohio did for Trump—has drawn its map so that all 5 of its congressional seats belong to Democrats. All of Massachusetts’ 9 seats are held by Democrats. Likewise, Democrats have 7 of 8 seats in Maryland, which means they would not contest the Common Cause litigation there if they really believed in its premise. If the proportion of congressional seats were set by the percentage of the popular vote (which is inclusive of illegal ballot counts), then Republicans have been cheated out of about 8 seats just in these 3 states. Yet they have not been, and Democrats have not been cheated here in the Midwest, either. The real problems of gerrymandering which no one seems to want to talk about are at the precinct level in Democrat-controlled cities, and in Democrat-run states like New York, New Jersey and California, or now in Pennsylvania.
For comparison, Wisconsin officially went to Joe Biden in 2020. Democrats have 2 of 8 seats there. South Carolina, where the popular vote margin was close to Ohio’s, entitles the Democrats to 1 of 8 seats. That is 3 out of Ohio’s 16 total, or 2 of 15 after redistricting by South Carolina’s almost identical ratio by analogy. This is especially relevant as South Carolina was one of two states that had no redistricting lawsuits brought against it in the 60-year period analyzed by Gimpel et al.
Just 3 of Missouri’s 114 counties along with St. Louis City went Democrat in 2020, the large majority of the rest being at least 70% Republican. One could make the argument that our government is not representative based on the fact that Democrats have 2 of 8 congressional seats there. But that would be wrong, because Democrats control the two largest population centers, each of which officially went at least 58% Democrat, so they are actually entitled to that disproportionate number.
Likewise, Ohio has 3 counties where more votes were cast in 2020 than were cast in Missouri’s second Democrat stronghold of Jackson County. Of these, Hamilton County’s margin for Biden was not enough to justify the Democrats’ suggestion that they are entitled to another congressional district in light of the fact that the whole surrounding area is decidedly red. Whereas Hamilton officially went to Biden by 16%, each of the 3 counties bordering it went to Trump by more than 40,000 votes (24%, 30.8% and 36.6%, respectively). Based on this alone, it is clear that the Democrats are the ones trying to gerrymander the map by splitting Hamilton County in a way which only makes sense if you understand that their intent is to group Republican voters in Hamilton with Republican voters in Clermont to give the Democrats an unfair and unconstitutional advantage. This is clearly why they insisted with no city other than Cincinnati in mind that a municipality within a certain population range cannot be split.
However, a district based in Cincinnati which cannot be split contradicts the requirement that districts be compact. The municipality of Cincinnati itself is not compact, but sprawls along the Ohio River. So the splitting of Cincinnati would not constitute an undue split, and the only statistic the Democrats can cite to the contrary is the popular vote total. But the concept of a “popular vote” did not enter into the minds of the Framers of the US Constitution except as a thing to be avoided, as they unanimously regarded mob rule as the very worst form of government, which is exactly why our system of government does not allow the majority party to just stamp the minority party out of existence.
Congressional Selective Representation Index
Below is the complete set of data for the statewide vote proportions of the two major parties based on data from DRA 2020. They are, in order of columns: the 2020 presidential election percentages by party (D: Democrat, R: Republican); the 2018 gubernatorial election percentages by party where available, or otherwise statewide senatorial election percentages if no gubernatorial election was held; the 2016 presidential election percentages by party; the sums of the values by party; the total of the two sums; and the vote proportion for each party (the individual sums by party divided by the total). The purpose of this data set is to provide a true composite voting margin for each state without the skew of votes for third-party and independent candidates, who only very rarely win federal elections.
From these data, we can create a Congressional Proportional Representation Index (CPRI), an index of what proportional representation would look like in each state. The data are, in order of columns: the number of districts in the state; the two-party proportion of the vote (from Table 1); the percentages multiplied by the number districts (which for statistical purposes I have rounded to the nearest integer); the actual numbers of seats currently held by each party; and the net change if the seats were apportioned according to popular vote percentages instead of plurality in existing districts.
The data from this table are what we would need to establish an argument for proportional representation, which the Democrats making the case have not done. Of interest here is that states with only 1 congressional district cannot be flipped, so that the argument would still be inconsistent even if it were applied consistently, which it is not. Overall, the Democrats would not gain more than perhaps 2 or 3 seats, as they would be at a disadvantage in several in states which they have gerrymandered or otherwise have the advantage in, including 8 in California alone, or 4 in Massachusetts.
However, no one including the Democrats actually wants proportional representation; what they are seeking is more congressional seats only in the states of their choosing, which is to say, the states which they have not already gerrymandered to their advantage. So while the CPRI may be useful, it does not accurately reflect the intent of the lawsuits brought against Republican legislatures, or the overall outcome which the Democrats are aiming for with their strategic gerrymandering plan. Therefore, we can use a Congressional Selective Representation Index (CSRI) to calculate the maximum number of seats they intend to steal nationwide through the selective application of the proportional representation argument in legal challenges.
The states which have been omitted between the CPRI with the CSRI are those which Democrats will not apply their argument to because they stand to lose, namely: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts and Rhode Island. As they started with Florida and Pennsylvania and are now working on Ohio as well as North Carolina and Wisconsin, it is clear that they are targeting swing states in order of where they have the most seats to gain. However, with gaining a single seat through gerrymandering in Oklahoma or Utah being virtually impossible due to the large margins favoring Republicans in each district, they will likely avoid these states and go for 2 seats each in Iowa and South Carolina. It really depends on the demographics of each state; what we can be sure of is that they will only act when they think they will benefit.
Also omitted from the index are states where Republicans could pick up a few seats but the effect of stealing elections cancels out the difference, namely: Arizona, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Virginia and Washington, per the Congressional Districts Corruption Index presented later. Other states with no possibility or likelihood of change, and which the Democrats therefore have no incentive to challenge are: Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming. Finally, the states where Democrats have already used the proportional representation argument successfully, are presently in the process of subverting, or could make the argument in the future (that is, the states listed in the CSRI), are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin. The net result is that the Democrats will be able to steal up to 24 congressional seats using the proportional representation argument if they succeed in each case, on top of the 24-42 they have already stolen through a combination of gerrymandering and election fraud.
The only states where the number of seats already stolen is greater than the number which they would stand to gain through gerrymandering by proportional representation are Florida and Pennsylvania, as well as Georgia. As these are the states where the strategy has already succeeded, we can reasonably assume that the Democrats’ long-term strategy entails election rigging beyond gerrymandering facilitated by the proportional representation argument. That is, rather than Republicans having a chance of winning an equal proportion of the “competitive” districts, the Democrats’ aim is to secure them all by fraud. Based on the evidence of Florida and Pennsylvania, the argument for fair districts, where “fair” is defined as “competitive,” is essentially an argument for gerrymandering in order to make possible the theft of congressional seats through election fraud.
Statistics as a litmus to identify gerrymandering and test claims
What we can reasonably expect from a map which does not employ the first type of gerrymander described in Section I—that of widening the margin in a district—is an overall tendency toward the statewide average of votes along party lines in the previously unevenly proportioned districts. The reason for this is simple: if the people voting for each party were evenly distributed across the state, then the majority party would win every race by the same average margin. (The Democrats’ argument for proportional representation assumes exactly the opposite, that they are entitled to more seats than they win based on the fact that they get a certain percentage of the total vote in any given election.) Statisticians would measure the real-world deviation from the statewide margin by calculating the standard deviation, determining where the values of each district’s votes by party fall within the parameters of the distribution curve, and looking for outliers as anomalies.
What we can reasonably expect from a map which does not employ the second type of gerrymander—that of unfairly gaining more legislative seats for a party—is that the final number of seats would reflect the tendency toward the statewide voting averages. (In most cases, this is basically the opposite of the Democrats’ expectations and the purpose for their ongoing attempts at changing the process.) Due to the heavy concentrations of Democrat voters in urban areas and Republican voters in rural areas, it would be impossible to bring the balance to zero so that one party had all the seats in a state as large as Florida, Pennsylvania or Ohio, but the tendency toward the statewide margin average which no gerrymandering entails necessarily means that either the map is being gerrymandered to unfairly favor the minority party which holds the urban votes, or that the urban centers are large enough to justify that party picking up more seats.
In the case of Ohio, only two Democrat-controlled cities are large enough to justify their own districts, as we have seen with the analogy to Missouri. What this means is that without gerrymandering, Ohio Democrats could be expected to hold exactly 2 or 3 congressional seats, with the Republicans having the advantage in the other 12 or 13 districts of anywhere from the statewide margin average of about 6 or 7% to whatever numbers balance out the heavy concentration of the Democrat votes in the cities. The effect on the outliers of no more gerrymandering, especially for the majority party, is that their margins are reduced, but only so that they even out a little, not so significantly that the seats could be contested.
Now let us apply a statistical measure to identify these two types of gerrymandering, and to demonstrate the difference between the common expectations and the reality. In statistics, a random variable is the variable whose output can be any value from a set of possible outcomes. Our random variables are the margins between the two major political parties. The margins are consistently calculated with the formula a – b = c, where a is the percentage of voters in any given congressional district who have voted for the Democratic candidate on the general election ballot, b is the percentage who voted for the Republican candidate, and c is the difference. All voting data are taken from the Dave’s Redistricting App 2016-2020 composite scores.
While the margins of voting preferences over a period of time are technically discrete, ranging from 0 to 1 (0% to 100%), due to the populations of congressional districts, the possibilities for proportions of votes within a district are closer to infinity than the outcomes which we round to the nearest tenth of a percent. An objective measure of the distribution of values will therefore take a graphical representation form similar to a continuous random variable. In statistics, this is called probability density function, or PDF. The difference is that instead of the curve approaching negative infinity or infinity, as with an algebraic equation, it will approach a set of defined values.
Our first objective measure is the set of all margins in the congressional districts of a state. As the formula a – b = c allows a range of {-100:100}, and all negative values indicate a historical trend for voters to elect Democrats, while all positive values indicate of trend for voters to elect Republicans, the projected advantage or disadvantage to one or the other of these political parties in future elections based on how the districting lines are drawn is reducible to a dichotomy of negative and positive values, where the magnitude of the difference is the projected margin of victory. As the outcomes of elections are essentially unpredictable to a point, and close races are typically rigged by election fraud, I assign no degree of confidence. Instead, it is understood that election results will vary, but the utility of the function is that large numbers of inputs create trends which yield a high level of accuracy, based on the law of large numbers. In practice, we can still use this formula while accounting for anomalies by identifying other variables.
The data sets and representative graphs for margins are essential for arguing against proportional representation in any given state wherever the statewide voting margin favors a majority party, because they demonstrate that in such cases, the argument for proportional representation is an argument for an unconstitutional gerrymander. However, as there is no constitutional basis for this notion, so that it is a political or a legal matter, this is not my main concern. I will use it to demonstrate the failure of supposedly remedial plans which are in the process of being implemented without a constitutional basis, as that is emerging as the biggest threat to democratic representation in America. However, the main concern here is creating an objective measure of what actually constitutes gerrymandering, by demonstrating whether or not the results of a districting plan are fair to each party. This can only be done as a measure of the probability of the projected outcome based on previous elections data.
In Ohio, the recent historical trend of voting margins is also a criterion for determining the constitutionality of a redistricting proposal, per Article XI, Section 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution, which reads, “The statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.” To date, those who have argued that Ohio’s districting maps are unconstitutional based on this provision have not offered any objective measure of what voting preferences entails. The results of my margins probability distribution formula compared against actual and expected results is an objective measure which their allegations can be compared against, not just in Ohio, but anywhere where there is a sufficient number of measures to plot a curve. As it is, I have plotted a curve for every state with more than one congressional district in order to show its distribution.
The notion of proportional representation assumes uniformity of distribution of the output of some function—in this case which party controls however many seats of a state’s slate of representatives in the US House of Representatives, or a state legislature. The argument for proportional representation is invalid unless it follows an objective measure which can be applied uniformly to all situations. In science, mathematics and statistics, the accepted measure is the normal distribution curve, which is a plot of the points in a data set by probability ranges defined by standard deviations from the mean.
While it is possible that results might fall more than 3 or 4 standard deviations (SD or σ) outside the mean (μ), it is unlikely in small data sets, and indeed there is no such instance in any of the 50 states’ congressional districts maps. 99.73% of the time, the variables plotted on a normal distribution curve are within 3 SD from the mean. 95.45% of the time they are within 2 SD, and 68.27% of the time they are within 1 SD. The normal distribution curve is therefore an objective and extremely useful measure used by statisticians for a wide array of data sets.
This is a graph of a cumulative distribution function (CDF) for a random variable, where the probability density function is a normal distribution. The CDF range of {0:1} is useful for demonstrating the probability of a random event (in this case, a district’s margin being the result of a random distribution, as opposed to intentionally or by some other nonrandom process). The PDF is useful for determining the overall randomness of the plot (in our case, whether it was done intentionally to favor or disfavor a party), as well as identifying outliers (in our case, districts which may have been targeted by gerrymandering).
Given the data in Table 1 (the composite two-party voting percentages of all 50 states), we already have everything we need to determine the soundness of the argument that a state’s districts map is unfair based on the concept of proportional representation. While the narrower data are not yet available for some new maps that have already been challenged, such as the Ohio state assembly map, the argument has already been made by the same parties with regard to the current one, so we will put the argument to rest in order that we may then move on.
In order to demonstrate that the Ohio General Assembly map is not representative of the will of the voters, we would have to find a significant number of exceptions to the 68-95-99.7 rule. That is, statistical evidence in support of this claim should consist of outliers which we can identify on a plot of the normal distribution. Altogether, there are 6 margins which fall between -3 and -2 SD, 11 between -2 and -1 SD, 23 between -1 SD and the mean, 46 between the mean and +1 SD, and 13 between +1 and +2 SD. (I will explain the function of this graph momentarily.)
Recall that negative values represent Democrat seats and positive values represent Republican seats. What this means is that the districts are generally set up with Democrat voters being more concentrated in their districts. As the real, effective type of gerrymandering entails the dilution of votes to give the majority party an unfair advantage, this is the opposite of what we would expect if there were any intentional gerrymandering. Instead, the evidence may be interpreted as that communities of interest have been kept intact to a greater degree than would be expected if the results were more uniform, and therefore as conformity with state and federal legislation, i.e., the Voting Rights Act.
Much could be said of the fact that there are margins within the -3 to -2 SD range but not above +2 SD. However, the reason is clear when one looks at the voting data; the voters in many inner-city precincts in Ohio vote as much as 96-100% Democrat, and the further out from the cities one goes, the more the trend favors the GOP, but it never reaches that level of disparity of the inner cities and is rarely even above 80% for one party or the other outside the high-population density areas, of which there are only a few, so that the curve is heavily weighted on that end. More importantly, we do not find any outliers, as they are all within the normal distribution, so it is entirely reasonable and fair, and there is no clear, objective evidence of gerrymandering favoring one party or the other. If we want to apply the 68-95-99.7 rule strictly, then we might say that the minority is theoretically entitled to 1 or 2 more seats than it is projected to have, depending on how it is rounded, but no more than that, and there are several more districts which are within the margins of error, the majority of which lean in the direction of the majority party, so the reality is that the minority party is statistically likely to pick up 1 or 2 of those in the election, canceling out the 1 outlier. In any case, a single outlier in a data set of 99 cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidence of gerrymandering, much less legislatively determinative.
Contrary to the notion that communities of interest by necessity are to be kept intact, Democrats also argue that there should be more districts that are competitive for them, which means they have margins close to 0 or favoring their candidates. But this is a fallacy; competitiveness means that there are more districts near the mean, not near to 0. Currently, there are 7 districts which have margins between 0 and the mean of 6.103, or which lean Republican but under the average margin, and another 13 which lean either Republican or Democrat with single-digit margins, so this argument is totally without merit. As it is, if the Democrats performed well in the election and won every seat which was within a single-digit spread, they would control 45 of the 99 seats, which is exactly what they are demanding with their argument for proportional representation. That is, the amount of competitiveness which they are claiming to want is already inherent in the map which they are contesting.
This should put the argument for proportional representation based on the numbers of projected legislative seats to rest. However, for the sake of the argument, I have also devised an objective measure for proportional representation with regard to the probability of districts swinging one way or the other to determine the validity of the allegation that Republicans in Ohio have diluted Democrat votes. After all, that is what the graph of a normal distribution curve is intended to represent. While this does not contain any new data plots, it further demonstrates that the entire data set falls within the normal distribution curve, with a good amount of competitive districts and no clear trend favoring or disfavoring either major political party.
For comparison, here is a graph of the US House district margins in New Jersey, ranked #1 in each of the indices which I have created to measure gerrymandering, along with a histogram showing how improbable the district margins probabilities in that state are by random distribution. As you can see, the distribution is heavily weighted as well as uniformly distributed on the Republican end. This makes it much easier overall for the Democrats to steal as many seats as they can by fraud; the end result is that the Republicans control 2 out of 12 districts despite having advantages in 6.
See how neither the Karch (2021) map nor the Yuko (2021) map follows a normal distribution curve, but the Miller (2021) map does. This is what we should expect of the difference between gerrymandered maps with one that is not gerrymandered.
No state’s margins data fit the normal distribution curve as well as this, because my map is the first one to be developed according to statistical principles and to Ohio’s constitutional guidelines which are now the strictest in the nation. Some states are closer to the ideal than others, while others are blatantly gerrymandered. For example, compare the distribution curve for South Carolina, which the Democrats’ activist groups are contesting now, with that of New York, which they are invested in protecting.
Statistical variance as evidence of gerrymandering
Variance is the square of the deviation of a random variable from a normal distribution mean; it measures how far the probability of the event deviates from the expected result of normal distribution. As such, it can be applied to the matter of redistricting as an objective means of confirming or negating any suspicion of gerrymandering. Where the suspicion is confirmed, we can objectively determine that there is cause to examine a district in closer detail by other means; where it is negated, it can be understood that if there was any intent to gerrymander, it failed. In this way, we can reduce the effort necessary to identify and challenge attempts to gerrymander legislative maps to a feasible amount.
As a uniform distribution of voting margins (the basis for any sound argument for either competitiveness in elections or proportional representation in redistricting) necessarily means a trend toward the statewide voting margins average, the result of any worthwhile efforts to curtail gerrymandering should be reflected in the reduction of the statistical variance in the set of margins values. This is also why the argument for measuring the competitiveness of a district by its proximity to a balance of 0 instead of to the mean is invalid. The more uniform the distribution of a set, the less variance there will be; the more variance, the less uniform the distribution. (Deviation from the mean increases variance. The Democrats’ remedial maps necessarily increase gerrymandering in order to produce the desired outcomes, which we see and can quantify in the increased variance.)
Once we have compiled the data, we can use a box and whisker plot to graphically represent the likelihood that a districting map is intentionally gerrymandered. However, this is somewhat subjective, and can only be used as an evidentiary basis to support or deny suspicion of gerrymandering, as there are other factors to consider and which may skew the results, including but not limited to election fraud, inaccurate data and concentrated vote distributions (outliers). Also, it is important to note that while attempting to identify states which have gerrymandered maps is subjective, a measure of variance is not, so a comparison between one state’s map with another’s is still an objective measure of the difference in the amount of gerrymandering between the two.
It was necessary to present the maps discussed in the Section II (the existing Ohio congressional districts map, the Karch map, the Yuko map and the Miller map) in order to establish a provenance for the data discussed here. Now the Democrats’ and activist groups’ intent to gerrymander the Ohio congressional districts map will be expressly evident by a comparison of the measures of variance between the sets of the data drawn from these maps. Again, this is an objective measure; in effect, it debunks all subjective claims to the contrary, such as the ones found in the lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s new state assembly map.
As the first stage of the Democrats’ plan to gerrymander Ohio’s congressional districts is already implemented, the new constitutional criteria for redistricting in Ohio make outliers necessary due to the distribution of votes along party lines. The goal, therefore, is not to eliminate outliers, but to reduce the overall margins, which has the effect of reducing the statistical variance. If done successfully, the evidence should only weakly support the allegation of gerrymandering, as represented by the extremely truncated forms of both the “boxes” representing the interquartile range of margins and the “whiskers” representing the overall range in the graph, as we find in the graph of my data. If done unsuccessfully or not at all, the forms will be elongated, as we find in the other graphs. The fact that outliers are made necessary by the constitutional criteria but are not present in the graph of the Karch data demonstrate the failure of the League of Women Voters to meet the same criteria which they have managed to establish as law. Notice that the present, allegedly gerrymandered Ohio map has two such outliers—one for each party (the dots on the graph).
We can see from a visual comparison that there is more variance in the Karch map than there is in the existing districts map—an increase from 675.3115 to 780.0553, or 15.5%, to be exact. My map, on the other hand, decreases the variance by 10.4%, to 605.1723.
Once again, these graphs are only visual representations of the data sets, and therefore subject to some small degree of interpretation, but the data themselves do not lie. The 10.4% reduction which I have achieved is approximately how much room the current map has for improvement within the bounds set by the constitutional amendment. The intent of the activist groups to gerrymander Ohio, represented by the Karch map, is therefore evidently about 2.5 times as much as the current map could be theoretically said to be gerrymandered. However, it is the Yuko map which the Senate Democrats have proposed, so that is the one which best represents their best effort to fix the perceived gerrymandering problem in Ohio, ostensibly. So the fact that there is a 19% variance difference between the Yuko map with mine proves beyond a doubt that they are either incompetent or that their intent is to gerrymander, and either way should not be guiding the redistricting process.
Here are the different data sets which I have used to create the normal distribution curves, along with the population count, sum, mean, variance and standard deviation values. The variable α represents the variance of the current Ohio districts map; β is the mean. Boundaries are drawn to place values within a range of -1 to 1 SD, in order to demonstrate how effective the distribution is in accomplishing the goal of district margins tending toward the statewide average, as a measure of the map’s compliance with anti-gerrymandering regulations. Note that while the Yuko map (n=10) is better than the Karch map (n=9), it is not as good as either the current Ohio map (n=11) or mine (n=12).
The Karch map, representing the intent of the League of Women Voters, does not do anything to remedy Ohio’s current alleged gerrymandering problem; it just exacerbates it. The margins of the districts which are blatantly being stolen from the Republicans are each within about 3 points, and one is within about 1. With Karch’s declared maximum population variation of up to 3%, either of these seats could easily go back to GOP control simply by assigning the correct population values to the district. With one third of the districts under the statewide margin average, we would expect the standard deviation and the statistical variance to be significantly decreased if there were no gerrymandering here. Instead, what we find is that the variance is increased by more than one third the original. And while some of this variance could be written off as necessary based on the new criteria and to increased polarity due to Ohio’s losing a district, such as accounts for the lesser discrepancy with my map, Ms. Karch’s map does not meet any of the criteria other than keeping counties intact. The fact that the standard deviation is increased means that despite that several of the margins have been brought to well below the average, the value of the outliers is greater. That is, Republican votes have been intentionally diluted to give the Democrats an unfair advantage in each of the districts created with handing control over to them in mind. If we extend the ranges to account for standard deviations beyond 1, we also find that there are more outliers, which is also one of the results of an intentional gerrymander.
The Senate Democrats’ map is a better attempt, as the districts are at least somewhat more compact and the variance is reduced, but it is still not an improvement on the existing map, for the same reasons. For this map, I have used the margins data which they have provided, which may account for the difference in the mean. But as the mean is higher than it is in the existing map’s data, that means that pulling a district’s margin down into the competitive range requires even more of a gerrymander. So the fact that the Senate Democrats managed to create as many districts for their party as Karch did means they must have done so intentionally, as it is otherwise statistically improbable. And the reason this matters is that they are claiming to want “fairness,” while gerrymandering is the opposite. Unless their methodology changes completely, we can reasonably expect the same statistical trends from any other attempt to create Democrat districts anywhere in the country, because the population numbers and voting demographics do not allow them any other way of doing it, and it is impossible to hide.
Recall that my statistical prediction with regard to a map which does not employ the second type of gerrymander—that of unfairly gaining more seats for a party—is that the final number of seats would reflect the tendency toward the statewide voting averages. In Ohio, the Democrats should retain exactly 2 or 3 seats due to the concentrations of voters in Columbus and Cleveland. Yet the Senate Democrats have carved out 7 for their party, and only 1 is at or near the target margin of 6-7%—yet more clear evidence of intentional gerrymandering. 4 of my districts, on the other hand, are right at the target range. This is done with no division or dilution of the votes in municipalities protected first under the Voting Rights Act and again by the constitutional reform.
For comparison, Pennsylvania’s supposedly remedial map has a much higher variance than Ohio’s current, supposedly gerrymandered one. So the fact that this was done not only intentionally but also with the help of the Democrats on the state supreme court which does not have the legitimate authority to create or choose its own map is evidence of a criminal conspiracy to defraud the people of Pennsylvania, and of treason against the Constitution of the United States.
Even with a standard deviation 23% greater than mine and despite Pennsylvania’s 3 extra districts (before Ohio’s redistricting), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania still only managed to place 1 more district to within 1 SD of the mean. My numbers here prove that Pennsylvania’s theoretically remedial map is statistically without merit and constitutes an unconstitutional gerrymander which the Democrats are trying to replicate here in Ohio, as well as in North Carolina, Wisconsin, and eventually, in other states which lean Republican. Based on their successes in Florida and Pennsylvania alone, if it were not for this, Democrats would not already control the US House of Representatives. If they also have their way where the legal challenges using the same invalid arguments are either currently on the docket or else pending a new map’s approval, then their margin in the House will nearly double.
The intent is the same in either case: to give the Democrats more seats, at the expense of fairness and by deliberately disenfranchising voters who happen to live outside the bigger cities and vote Republican. In fact, the variance of the Karch map divided by the number of districts (52) is actually greater than that of Pennsylvania’s (51). This means that, according to the metric presented in Section VIII, the intent of the League of Women Voters who have already brought a suit against Ohio legislators over their state map is to make Ohio’s congressional districts map the second-most gerrymandered in America, after New Jersey’s seemingly unsurpassable feat—under the pretense of correcting the very same problem, but which they cannot even prove exists.
As for the nation as a whole, as of October 5, 2021, the following states have only 1 at-large US congressional district, and therefore could not possibly produce gerrymandered congressional maps: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming. The other 43 states are listed below in alphabetical order. For the purpose of aiding in interpretation, I have qualified the existing distribution of congressional seats in the following (bold) terms: fair; questionable (deviates from the normal distribution by one); unfair (deviates from the normal distribution by more than one—New Hampshire only); and disproportionate (Texas only). Similarly, I have qualified the suggestion of gerrymandering as either supported, weakly supported or unsupported by the evidence, and the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in the state as certain, practically certain, likely, possible but unlikely, implausible and unlikely, or, impossible or unsuccessful. Once again, these interpretive metrics are subjective, but the variance values are not.
Alabama
Alabama has 7 US congressional districts: 1 is held by a Democrat and 6 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 24.5%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Alabama would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Alabama is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Alabama would be frivolous.
Arizona
Arizona has 9 US congressional districts: 5 are held by Democrats and 4 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 6%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Arizona would be supported by the evidence.
The Arizona secretary of state’s destruction of evidence and refusal to comply with audits of the 2020 US presidential election make the question of election fraud incontestable. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Arizona is certain to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Arkansas
Arkansas has 4 US congressional districts: all 4 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 30.5%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Arkansas would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Arkansas is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Arkansas would be frivolous.
California
California has 53 US congressional districts: 42 are held by Democrats and 11 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 28.5%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in California would be supported by the evidence.
California has a wide range of credible allegations of election fraud in every election cycle, including the recent referendum to recall Governor Newsom. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in California is likely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Colorado
Colorado has 7 US congressional districts: 4 are held by Democrats and 3 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 10.2%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Colorado would be supported by the evidence.
Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Colorado is possible but unlikely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections, though an audit is perhaps warranted.
Connecticut
Connecticut has 4 US congressional districts: all 4 are held by Democrats. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 12.8%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Connecticut would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Connecticut is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Connecticut would be frivolous.
Florida
Florida has 27 US congressional districts: 11 are held by Democrats and 16 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 1.7%, this is a questionable distribution of congressional districts. However, the circumstances of the composition of the congressional districting map make the affirmation of gerrymandering incontestable.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Florida would be supported by the evidence.
Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Florida is certain to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Georgia
Georgia has 14 US congressional districts: 6 are held by Democrats and 8 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 2.1%, this is a questionable distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Georgia would be supported by the evidence.
The Georgia secretary of state’s destruction of evidence and refusal to comply with audits of the 2020 US presidential election make the question of election fraud incontestable. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Georgia is certain to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Hawaii
Hawaii has 2 US congressional districts: both are held by Democrats. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 31.6%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Hawaii would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Hawaii is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Hawaii would be frivolous.
Idaho
Idaho has 2 US congressional districts: both are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 29.9%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Idaho would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Idaho is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Idaho would be frivolous.
Illinois
Illinois has 18 US congressional districts: 13 are held by Democrats and 5 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 17.3%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Illinois would be supported by the evidence.
The city of Chicago has a long history of organized election fraud, including the mayor’s direct participation in and direction of the nationwide conspiracy to elect John Kennedy to the presidency, as well as similar efforts to advance the political career of Barack Obama. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Illinois is likely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Indiana
Indiana has 9 US congressional districts: 2 are held by Democrats and 7 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 14.2%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Indiana would be supported by the evidence.
Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Indiana is possible but unlikely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections, though an audit is perhaps warranted.
Iowa
Iowa has 4 US congressional districts: all 4 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 7.1%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Iowa would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Iowa is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Iowa would be frivolous.
Kansas
Kansas has 4 US congressional districts: 1 is held by a Democrat and 3 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 10.7%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Kansas would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Kansas is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Kansas would be frivolous.
Kentucky
Kentucky has 6 US congressional districts: 1 is held by a Democrat and 5 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 28.9%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Kentucky would be supported by the evidence.
Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Kentucky is possible but unlikely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections, though an audit is perhaps warranted.
Louisiana
Louisiana has 6 US congressional districts: 1 is held by a Democrat and 5 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 19.7%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Louisiana would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Louisiana is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Louisiana would be frivolous.
Maine
Maine has 2 US congressional districts: both are held by Democrats. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 7%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Maine would be unsupported by the evidence.
CPVI gives Republicans a +6 advantage in Maine’s 2nd congressional district, and the true margin is 13%. The Democrats secured the seat by rigging the election through a ranked-choice voting system to give their candidate a 1% margin of victory. Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Maine is practically certain to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Maryland
Maryland has 8 US congressional districts: 7 are held by Democrats and 1 is held by a Republican. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 16.4%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Maryland would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Maryland is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Maryland would be frivolous.
Massachusetts
Massachusetts has 9 US congressional districts: all 9 are held by Democrats. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 9.4%, this is a questionable distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Massachusetts would be unsupported by the evidence.
With voters electing a Republican governor in 2018 by two thirds of the vote and then going for the Democrat nominee for US president by the same margin in 2020, suspicions of election interference in Massachusetts are more than justified. However, the voting margins in the districts allow the disproportionate 9:0 Democrat advantage, meaning that in order to prove there is gerrymandering in Massachusetts, one would also have to prove systemic election fraud. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Massachusetts is possible but unlikely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Michigan
Michigan has 14 US congressional districts: 7 are held by Democrats and 7 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 4.1%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Michigan would be supported by the evidence.
The Michigan secretary of state’s destruction of evidence and refusal to allow an audit of the 2020 US presidential election make the question of election fraud incontestable. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Michigan is certain to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Minnesota
Minnesota has 8 US congressional districts: 4 are held by Democrats and 4 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 7.1%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Minnesota would be supported by the evidence.
CPVI lists Minnesota’s 2nd congressional district as even, but the seat was won by a Democrat at about the margin of the nationwide election fraud by remote vote switching. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Minnesota is likely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Mississippi
Mississippi has 4 US congressional districts: 1 is held by a Democrat and 3 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 18.1%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Mississippi would be supported by the evidence.
Mississippi’s Republican districts have margins of more than 30% on average. In effect, it wouldn’t be possible to create another Democrat district without gerrymandering. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Mississippi is implausible and unlikely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Missouri
Missouri has 8 US congressional districts: 2 are held by Democrats and 6 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 13.7%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Missouri would be supported by the evidence.
Missouri’s Republican districts have margins of more than 30% on average. The only relatively close one is District 2 which has been securely Republican since the 1990s. In effect, it wouldn’t be possible to create another Democrat district without gerrymandering. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Missouri is implausible and unlikely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Nebraska
Nebraska has 3 US congressional districts: all 3 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 21.4%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Nebraska would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Nebraska is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Nebraska would be frivolous.
Nevada
Nevada has 4 US congressional districts: 3 are held by Democrats and 1 is held by a Republican. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 3.1%, this is a questionable distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Nevada would be supported by the evidence.
The state of Nevada’s acceptance of illegal ballots combined with organized coverups make the question of election fraud in Nevada incontestable. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Nevada is certain to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
New Hampshire
New Hampshire has 2 US congressional districts: both are held by Democrats. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans, this is an unfair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in New Hampshire would be unsupported by the evidence.
Video evidence of election workers stuffing ballot boxes makes the question of election fraud in New Hampshire incontestable. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in New Hampshire is likely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
New Jersey
New Jersey has 12 US congressional districts: 10 are held by Democrats and 2 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 14.1%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts. However, district margins favor Republicans in 6 of the 12 districts. A closer examination of the 4 competitive districts favoring Republicans and held by Democrats is necessary to determine the fairness of the map with regard to the question of election fraud.
An allegation of gerrymandering in New Jersey would be supported by the evidence.
Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in New Jersey is practically certain to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
New Mexico
New Mexico has 3 US congressional districts: 2 are held by Democrats and 1 is held by a Republican. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 11.7%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in New Mexico would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in New Mexico is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in New Mexico would be frivolous.
New York
New York has 27 US congressional districts: 17 are held by Democrats and 10 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 23.8%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in New York would be supported by the evidence.
New York has a long history of election fraud and was notorious already in the mid-19th Century for its political graft machine. That there is currently corruption in state politics is clear but the extent of it is not. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in New York is likely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
North Carolina
North Carolina has 13 US congressional districts: 5 are held by Democrats and 8 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 2.6%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts. However, the voting margin for District 6 strongly favors the Republicans but the seat is held by a Democrat. As a 4:9 distribution is also fair, a closer examination of this district is necessary to determine the fairness of the map with regard to the question of election fraud.
An allegation of gerrymandering in North Carolina would be supported by the evidence.
Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in North Carolina is possible but unlikely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections, though an audit is perhaps warranted.
Ohio
Ohio has 16 US congressional districts: 4 are held by Democrats and 12 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 6.8%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Ohio would be supported by the evidence.
Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Ohio is possible but unlikely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections, though an audit is perhaps warranted.
Oklahoma
Oklahoma has 5 US congressional districts: all 5 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 28.3%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Oklahoma would be unsupported by the evidence.
The narrowest margin of any district in Oklahoma is 9.1%. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Oklahoma is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Oklahoma would be frivolous.
Oregon
Oregon has 5 US congressional districts: 4 are held by Democrats and 1 is held by a Republican. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 12%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Oregon would be supported by the evidence.
Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Oregon is possible but unlikely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections, though an audit is perhaps warranted.
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has 18 US congressional districts: 9 are held by Democrats and 9 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 6%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts. However, the circumstances of the composition of the congressional districting map make the question of gerrymandering incontestable.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Pennsylvania would be supported by the evidence.
Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Pennsylvania is certain to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Rhode Island
Rhode Island has 2 US congressional districts: both are held by Democrats. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 18.3%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Rhode Island would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Rhode Island is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Rhode Island would be frivolous.
South Carolina
South Carolina has 7 US congressional districts: 1 is held by a Democrat and 6 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 11.5%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in South Carolina would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in South Carolina is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in South Carolina would be frivolous.
Tennessee
Tennessee has 9 US congressional districts: 2 are held by Democrats and 7 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 24.1%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Tennessee would be supported by the evidence.
As each of the Republican districts favors them by more than 32%, the extremely high degree of polarity in the voting demographics in Tennessee accounts for the statistical variance and eliminates the possibility of any effect which gerrymandering might otherwise have. Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Tennessee is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Tennessee would be frivolous.
Texas
Texas has 36 US congressional districts: 13 are held by Democrats and 23 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 9.5%, this is a disproportionate distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Texas would be supported by the evidence.
Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Texas is likely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Utah
Utah has 4 US congressional districts: all 4 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 26.8%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Utah would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Utah is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in Utah would be frivolous.
Virginia
Virginia has 11 US congressional districts: 8 are held by Democrats and 4 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 10.8%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts. However, the voting margin for District 7 favors the Republicans but the seat is held by a Democrat. As a 5:6 distribution is also fair, a closer examination of this district is necessary to determine the fairness of the map with regard to the question of election fraud.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Virginia would be supported by the evidence.
In 2020, Biden led Trump by a margin of 96,238 (52.7%) to 82,773 (45.3%) with 99.59% of Fairfax County precincts reporting. At the end of the night, his lead was 523,400 (71.1%) to 203,980 (27.7%). The largest municipality in Fairfax County (never mind precinct) has a population of under 25,000. This is clear evidence of election fraud favoring the winner of the down-ticket District 7 race. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Virginia is practically certain to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Washington
Washington has 10 US congressional districts: 7 are held by Democrats and 3 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Democrats by 18.1%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts. However, the voting margin for District 8 is too close to rule out election fraud. As a 6:4 distribution is also fair, a closer examination of this district is necessary to determine the fairness of the map with regard to the question of election fraud.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Washington would be supported by the evidence.
Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Washington is possible but unlikely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections, though an audit is perhaps warranted.
West Virginia
West Virginia has 3 US congressional districts: all 3 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion favoring Republicans by 26.8%, this is a fair distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in West Virginia would be unsupported by the evidence.
Based on this, the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in West Virginia is impossible or unsuccessful, so an audit of the most recent congressional elections in West Virginia would be frivolous.
Wisconsin
Wisconsin has 8 US congressional districts: 3 are held by Democrats and 8 are held by Republicans. With a statewide two-party vote proportion not clearly favoring either party, this is a questionable distribution of congressional districts.
An allegation of gerrymandering in Wisconsin would be supported by the evidence.
During the 2020 US presidential election, voter turnout in Wisconsin was 5.5 SD higher than the historical average. Precincts in Milwaukee recorded more votes than the population would have allowed, meaning the fact that there was fraud is an absolute certainty. While fraud favoring Democrats in that area would not have had an effect on the outcome of any of the races there, it could be interpreted as evidence of the intent to swing elections generally. CPVI gives Republicans a +4 advantage in Wisconsin’s 3rd congressional district, but the district is held by a Democrat. Based on this, the successful combination of gerrymandering and election fraud to rig elections in Wisconsin is likely to be proved by a valid audit of the most recent congressional elections.
Applying a uniform distribution curve to uniformly measure gerrymandering
I have used Louisiana as the example in Section I, not only because the congressional map’s appearance is suggestive of gerrymandering as people normally understand it, but also because Louisiana is actually one of the least gerrymandered states. Apart from the necessary outlier, there is so little variance and so much uniformity that the margins do not cross over at all, which would be necessary to establish even the possibility of gerrymandering. (See Figure 42.) With that in mind, here is a scatter plot showing the margins of Louisiana’s congressional districts; a negative value represents a district favoring Democrats and a positive value represents a district favoring Republicans:
This is what a graph of a distribution of seats along party lines with no gerrymandering whatsoever looks like. We know that the Democrats are entitled by federal law to their district in Baton Rouge and New Orleans, but it is the prerogative of the state’s legislature to handle the rest of the details. And Louisiana for whatever reason has a relatively uniform distribution of the voting margins in the state’s other districts, which is only possible if the Democrats are zoned into District 2.
Notice the plateau effect which uniform distribution has on the graph’s curve. Perfect uniformity of margins would entail no deviation from the mean, so a perfectly uniform distribution curve would consist of a straight horizontal line passing through plots on the x-axis, comprising the mean. The plateau effect which we can see on the Louisiana graph demonstrates what should happen when there is consistent uniformity between districts held by the majority party with the exception of whatever districts are necessarily (by the population distribution gradient and by law) controlled by the minority party, so that it is fair to both parties and to all the voters of the respective districts. As it concerns the matter of gerrymandering, this is what we would expect to find if we were to plot a cumulative distribution function for continuous uniform distribution, shown here:
Simply put, the more the graph veers from this ideal, the less uniform the distribution, and therefore the more likely that we are looking at a graph representing a gerrymandered districts map. The recent crop of lawsuits and constitutional reforms are aimed at creating artificial competitiveness in specific districts singled out as potential targets. As only Democrats are using this strategy currently, this has the effect of pulling some of the districts closer to or below 0 on the y-axis, and pushing the outliers further from it. Overall, the graph of a gerrymandered state is flattened, tending toward a straight line at something like a 45° angle.
This trend will be clearly evident in the gerrymandered states’ graphs presented in the remainder of this section. In the meantime, here are some other graphs conforming with the expectations for a continuous uniform distribution and showing no evidence of gerrymandering, to drive the point home. It is also probably worth noting that, although chosen randomly, these all happen to be graphs of states with Republican legislatures.
Despite having more plots and a narrower statewide margin average favoring Republicans, Ohio’s graph is consistent with these, and is therefore easily ranked among the fairest states for congressional representation by these measures. The form of the graph could easily be predicted based on a working knowledge of a uniform continuous distribution curve, where the distribution is actually relatively uniform.
That said, Ohio could still be better, and really needs to be, with the criteria established by the referendum ostensibly intended to make it so. Whereas the current Ohio congressional map has 11 out of 16 districts which are within 1 SD of the mean, my map has 12 out of 15 with less variance, which translates to a decrease in the standard deviation. The only way to make it more uniform would be to carve up the cities of Columbus and Cleveland in defiance of state and federal law.
Compare this to the Karch (2021) and Yuko (2021) maps introduced in the Section II (see Figure 10). The districts which the Democrats intend to steal (those artificially brought below y=0 at the expense of disenfranchised Republicans whose votes are diluted) are boxed in red.
Technically, Ohio has already given the Democrats 4 districts, so they are only trying to outright steal 3, not 5, but again, they are only entitled to 2. This policy could easily change with redistricting, and it is not at all a stretch to say that the sum of the criteria practically disallow the Democrats from acquiring any more than those, though fairness could still consist in perhaps as many as 5, given the population distribution, but only if we allow that the criterion of not drawing a single district to favor or disfavor a party is not being met. (This is not among the constitutional criteria in Ohio, but it is in some other states. Whereas Ohio requires the historical trend of party voting preferences to be taken into account, a court in North Carolina has forbidden legislators in that state from doing the same with regard to its state assembly map. It is unclear whether Democrats will be aided by judicial activists in this manner in the future, however, as it is absurd to expect legislators or even citizens concerned enough to participate in the process to not be influenced by political biases when drawing district lines.)
The national implications of this, of course, are enormous, and more than make up for the difference in the US House of Representatives. Generally, Democrats are able to gerrymander states where they have control of the legislature, but that is not really a concern for me, as that is their prerogative. However, in states where Republicans control the legislature, a narrow voting margin is a recipe for election theft by voter fraud or outside interference. Although it could be reasoned that the fraud could work either way, any suspicion of it must be based on either the outcome of the election in question or on specific allegations, such as we have seen in numerous red and swing states in the 2020 presidential election. With that in mind, let us look at Arizona, the state which has, so far, made the most progress in its forensic audit of the 2020 presidential election.
The distribution curve of Arizona is about what we might expect of a state which is divided about evenly between the two major parties. It is worth noting, therefore, that Arizona’s 1st congressional district is a historically red district and that Republicans have the advantage based on the DRA 2016-2020 composite score, yet it has been held by the same Democrat during that time. In baseball, a tie goes to the runner; in politics, it goes to the cheater.
Arizona voted for the GOP presidential candidate by a margin of 48.1:44.6 (+3.5) in 2016 and the GOP gubernatorial candidate by a margin of 56:41.8 (+14.2) in 2018. However, the 2020 US presidential election in Arizona has been forensically proved to have been tainted by election fraud favoring the Democrats, so we cannot rely on those numbers. That means that the last two federal and statewide elections in Arizona for which we have credible results give the Republicans an average margin of +8.85. Yet the districting plan adopted by the Arizona legislature favors the Democrats by a mean of 2.24, and Democrats hold 5 of the 9 seats. While each party should have a hold on 4 seats, with the other (District 1) being a toss-up, the previous election results show that the Republicans should have a statewide margins average of about 8.85 points above the -2.24 mean. This would give them about a 6-point advantage in District 1—well outside the Democrats’ reach. The Cook Partisan Voting Index (CPVI), while unreliable, gives the Republicans a 2-point advantage in District 1, yet the Democrat incumbent officially won it in 2020 by a 3.2% margin.
In total, the Republicans should hold 5 seats and the Democrats should hold 4. So District 1, being the only competitive district in Arizona, is, without question, the one which the Democrats have stolen. But this is not done primarily through election fraud; it is done by gerrymandering to carve out a competitive district, and then tipping the balance by election fraud. In fact, Democrats only began winning the district after the state’s redistricting following the 2010 census, but have held it ever since. Normally, the balance should tip in favor of the party in control of the legislature, as the majority party has the right to act in its own interests within the bounds of fairness while redistricting, or to the party with the overall statewide margin advantage, neither of which actually favors the Democrats in Arizona after the rampant fraud is accounted for. (The audit results which have been published to date are only preliminary and particular to Maricopa County, but they are outcome determinative.)
Our graph of the uniform distribution curve gives us an easy frame of reference to spot the fraud where it changes the outcome of an election by demonstrating the statistical anomaly. All we have to do is look for the dip below the uniform distribution curve where it crosses party lines (y=0), as in the case of Arizona’s District 1. However, a statistical anomaly is only cause for suspicion and does not constitute a proof. So this is only good for identifying which seats may have been stolen by voter fraud in previous elections and weeding out the results of competitive races for which there is no tangible evidence of rigging by election fraud. To ascertain whether or not the identified seats have actually been stolen, we will need further investigation (as with Arizona’s election audit) and a separate algorithm.
Before we do that, let us take a look at states which have recently seen results rigged for Democrats where the Republican Party controls the state legislature. The theory here is that gerrymandering favoring the Democrats does not generally occur in red states—at least not intentionally—so that when it does, it is intentional, as in the case of Georgia’s Districts 6 and 7.
Democrat operatives acting in city centers or out of state need to add fraudulent ballots to the counting stations or remotely change digitized results, as we have seen recently in Wisconsin, Michigan, Nevada and Pennsylvania. In most cases, the result is a single congressional seat stolen by the Democrats through election fraud, but it may be more if corrupt officials are able to bypass the legislature entirely, as in Pennsylvania where the Democrats have stolen about 4 seats and been foiled by voters in another attempted theft.
Wisconsin’s District 3 is about evenly divided between the major parties. The mean of the districts margins favors the Democrats by about 1.95% in Wisconsin, but after the tainted results are factored out, the state is about evenly divided, indicating that the advantage in District 3 should be about +2 for the GOP, give or take. The CPVI gives Republicans there a +4 advantage. As the Democrat incumbent officially won in 2020 by a margin of 2.7%, or just over 10,000 votes, the variance which could be accounted for by fraud ranges from about 4.7% by my estimate to about 6% by the CVPI’s reasoning.
It is impossible to get reliable data for recent elections in Michigan due to rampant election fraud in many locations, but the 2016 presidential election result which favored Republicans by +0.3 combined with the districts margin mean would indicate that somewhere in the vicinity of 5.7% of the state’s 2020 vote tally is tainted. Republicans have a 1.7% advantage in Michigan’s District 8, and Democrats have the same advantage in District 11. Based on a calibration of the statewide average, Republicans have advantages of about +7.4% in District 8 and +4% in District 11. The CPVI lists them as 4 and 2, respectively. (The CPVI estimates may be more accurate than mine.) I set the margins mean to 0, as that is my best estimate for the actual value rounded to the nearest integer. This gives Republicans the advantage in 9 of Michigan’s 14 districts, of which they actually hold 7. The remainder, of course, are Districts 8 and 11, which were without question stolen by Democrats, as District 5 may have been.
To date, no concrete estimate of the extent of election fraud in Nevada has been put forth. If the results of the recent presidential and gubernatorial elections were not tainted, then the statewide congressional districts margins average (and therefore the evidence of gerrymandering) would be approximately 2.5% in favor of the Democrats. In reality, whatever advantage either party has among voters is probably within the margin of error of any analysis.
Altogether, 3 of Nevada’s 4 congressional representatives are based in Las Vegas where the majority of voter fraud takes place. Adjusting the 0.8% advantage for Democrats in District 3 by 2.5% yields a result favoring Republicans by 1.7%, consistent with the CPVI estimate of +2. Doing the same for District 4 yields a result of 2.9% favoring Democrats, compared with the CPVI estimate of +1. The more plausible estimate gained by canceling out the 5.65% margin average for Democrats would mean taking each district’s margin and adding the Democratic candidate’s margin of victory to provide an estimate of how much fraud took place in each race. In the case of District 3, the incumbent won by 3% and the Democrats’ adjusted disadvantage is about 2.2%, so the seat was probably won by an election fraud margin of about 5%. In the case of District 4, the incumbent won by 4.9% and the Democrats’ adjusted advantage is about 2.4%, so the seat was probably won legitimately by the Democrats who secured it with election fraud. However, if the margins mean is completely canceled, then the Democrats’ 5.4% advantage in District 4 becomes a small Republican advantage, so an election fraud margin of about 5% (the District 3 estimate) may have actually swung the district in the Democrats’ favor.
In any case, election fraud certainly happened in both of these districts; the question of whether District 4 was swung by it would be irrelevant if it were to be settled fairly in a court, based on the judicial precedent of Marks v Stinson (1994). So although Nevada ideally should be split into 2 Republican districts and 2 Democrat districts according to the proportion and distribution of votes for either party, the Democrats’ fraud to cover 2 of their 3 seats actually means that Republicans have legitimate claims to 3 of them in the current congress, although that determination with respect to District 4 would need to be made by a court pending an audit or lawsuit.
Pennsylvania is the state with the most obvious election fraud. However, the role of gerrymandering permeates elections throughout the state, whereas the recent fraud in Pennsylvania has been shown to be more aimed at enabling the Democrats’ theft of the 2020 US presidential election. Whereas they had achieved moderate success in Florida previously, the Democrats’ outright theft of several congressional seats in Pennsylvania through gerrymandering is the blueprint which they are attempting to use in other states to maintain their illegal and unconstitutional control of the US House of Representatives. For our present purposes, it suffices to show that the combination of gerrymandering and election fraud has been used in Pennsylvania to steal 3 or 4 congressional seats—4 if the matter were adjudicated by the precedent of Marks v Stinson.
The last credible (pre-2020 taint) election results give Republicans a statewide +0.7% advantage, about twice the margin of Michigan. Democrats control 9 of the 18 seats, by a margins mean of 4.4%. Between the actual Republican advantage as measured by the 2016 presidential election results and the mean of the tainted congressional margins, the evidence of election fraud in Pennsylvania accounts for about 5% of the statewide vote and puts Republicans just ahead of Democrats in Districts 8 and 17 (currently held by Democrats), with Districts 1 and 7 being highly competitive (about 0.5% and 1.8% for Democrats, respectively). CPVI gives Republicans a +5 advantage in District 8 and a +2 advantage in District 17 which is known to have been stolen with the help of certain high-level Republicans. (District 17 is Conor Lamb’s district.) Districts 1 and 7 are evenly split between the major parties, so the gerrymandering efforts only enabled to Democrats to steal a total of 3 seats through election fraud, but the last elections (2012, 2014 and 2016) before the gerrymandered map was implemented gave the Republicans a 13:5 majority, so the net theft is actually 4.
Overall, Florida is one of the fairest states in terms of congressional districting in terms of proportions, perhaps owing to the constitutional reform. Republicans have a slight advantage, with a margins mean of about 1%. Republicans have the advantage in 14 of 27 (52%) districts and hold 16 (59%) of them, having outperformed the Democrats in the competitive Districts 26 and 27 by 3.4% and 2.8%, respectively. These margins are consistent with the trend, as the state went to Donald Trump by 3.3% in 2020 but only 1.2% in 2016.
The CPVI gives Democrats a +1 advantage in District 26 and a +4 advantage in District 27. However, the historically Republican District 13, which the CPVI says is evenly matched, was won by the Democrat incumbent by 6% in 2020. Districts 7 and 9, which the CPVI gives to the Democrats by +3 apiece, were each won by 12%. Given the statewide margins, these are clear anomalies.
Both of New Hampshire’s districts are routinely stolen by Democrats which otherwise favor Republicans by a mean of 6.7%. As there are certainly poll workers who are in the blatant fraud, a thorough forensic audit of every election would be necessary to legitimize the winners.
The amount of effort that goes into stealing congressional elections in New Jersey is such that it ranks first in each of my indices quantifying gerrymandering and election fraud. The districts stolen by Democrats in the last election are 3, 5, 7 and 11.
Virginia’s 7th congressional district was stolen in the last election. District 2 leans Democrat, so without a forensic audit or other means of establishing a paper trail of corruption, it is impossible to tell whether it, too, was stolen. Hence I have colored this one’s box orange to distinguish it from the previous 24 definitely stolen seats (including VA-7). (The green line runs from 0 at the first plot to the mean at the last; in order to establish an evidentiary basis for a district having been stolen, it must cross both this line and the line y=0, which the rest of these including VA-2 do not.)
Whereas the fraud in Michigan and Pennsylvania is opportunistic, Texas stands out as the only red state which can definitively be said to be rigged blue. Hence it is the only state which has a disproportionate distribution of congressional seats by my measure of variance. The districts which were likely stolen are 7, 15 and 32. We know that the Democrats certainly engaged in fraud in several municipalities in Texas, but otherwise Texas would be the state most likely to have Republican elections overturned by a forensic audit, based on numerous slim margin advantages. (Alternatively, it could just be that everything works the way it is supposed to in Texas, despite widespread Democrat voter fraud.)
Other states where elections are rigged for Democrats include the blue states of California (Districts 3, 7, 10, 36, 45, 49), Illinois (Districts 6, 14, 17) and New York (Districts 3 and 18).
Minnesota, where election fraud transcends party lines and has been a problem since at least 2002, has a dubious map and an equally dubious result in District 2.
Oregon’s Districts 4 and 5 and Washington’s District 8 are gerrymandered for the Democrats. Whether they were stolen in 2020 is a matter for auditors. The legitimacy of the elections depends on it, as otherwise the way the states are districted is a fair result of having Democrat-controlled legislatures.
Finally, here are the blue states which I had already identified as not gerrymandered before creating the uniform distribution function, namely: Connecticut, Maryland and Massachusetts. Each of the graphs looks how we should expect it to, and I find no evidence of unfair distribution.
Congressional Districts Corruption Index
In order to quantify and measure gerrymandering in a useful way, I have created a Congressional Districts Gerrymandering Index (CDGI). The CDGI is an algorithm computed by multiplying the statistical variance of the margins between districts (σ2) and the number of gerrymandered districts (g), and dividing the product by the total number of districts (d):
σ2 x g / d = x
A gerrymandered district is defined here as one that is within a 5-point margin favoring one major party or the other. CDGI scores are automatically rounded to the nearest integer and states are ranked from greatest to least based on their respective scores. All states with a score other than 0 are listed.
As gerrymandering is only evidence of the intent to steal or hold a disproportionate number of legislative seats unfairly, the process of rigging the election still needs to work in order for the goal of the gerrymandering to succeed. Recall that the precedent of Marks v Stinson is that if the winner is known to have participated in election fraud, then the election is invalid, so that even if the winner might have won anyway, the loser is awarded the seat. Also, the assumption is that without clear proof to the contrary, certain swing districts such as MN-2 and NC-6 rightfully belong to their respective winners.
In order to quantify and measure the greater problem of the cumulative effect of gerrymandering and election fraud in a useful way, I have created a Congressional Districts Corruption Index (CDCI). The CDCI is computed the same way as the CDGI except that the number of seats stolen by election fraud (s) is multiplied in the numerator:
σ2 x g x s / d = x
This gives us a truer measure of the amount of undue influence efforts to rig elections have in each of the 50 states. As with the CDGI, CDCI scores are automatically rounded to the nearest integer, states are ranked from greatest to least based on their respective scores, and all states with a score other than 0 are listed. I have also included the net result of the theft in each state in the list.
The net result of the rigged elections is that the Democratic Party controls 41 more seats in the US House of Representatives than it ought to based on voter preferences in 16 states.
These measures of gerrymandering and corruption should in no way be confused with other related issues, such as the amount of effort that goes into the rigging of other federal, statewide or local elections, or their outcomes. Presidential, gubernatorial and senatorial elections in particular cannot be associated with gerrymandering, as there are no districts to manipulate. The implications for state legislative maps, however, are enormous; based on the law of large numbers, we can assume that the same formulae which I have used here to test the constitutionality of a congressional district map should have greater success when applied to a state’s legislative assembly maps.
Conclusion
It should be apparent now that there are clear, discernable and quantifiable differences between districts maps which are gerrymandered with those that are not, as they represent different data sets when put through the same functions. Unfortunately, these functions have not been applied to this question in the past, even though redistricting has an enormous impact on the outcomes of elections, and is therefore of paramount political significance in our society. What the general public superficially interprets as evidence of gerrymandering is a sprawling district on a state map, but that subjective means should not determine public policy by way of our courts which are supposed to be objective, and where the validity of a plaintiff’s suit is supposed to be measured with regard to the evidence presented rather than superstition and hearsay. And while it could be interpreted as evidence of an intent to gerrymander, since that is a matter of interpretation and has legal implications, whether or not it constitutes actual gerrymandering is the real matter of concern, and that is something which we can quantify, as I have shown. So it should not be understood just from a casual glance at a districts map or by a constitutionally and mathematically invalid argument for proportional representation that gerrymandering is or is not happening in any given state. Also, and contrary to popular belief, gerrymandering is mostly a matter of how precincts are divided in Democrat-run cities.
Based on my analysis, I recommend statewide election audits in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Virginia. Depending on the results of such audits, other states’ legislatures might also decide that it is worth their trouble to conduct audits in districts identified as problematic, but as these are mostly blue states where gerrymandering and election fraud are known to occur and where the willing participation of the corrupt officials involved is highly unlikely, this is a matter which needs to be resolved at the federal level. (In particular, this applies to California, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.) Sooner or later, a comprehensive federal plan to stop election fraud will be necessary for the preservation of the republic against this subversion, especially as the agenda to abolish the Electoral College continues to gain traction among the political left. Our best defense currently against the rigging of presidential elections is the Electoral College; without it, a party relying on fraud can concentrate illegal ballot admissions in key areas to skew a popular vote and undermine the entire system. Likewise, our best defense against the rigging of congressional elections is keeping redistricting and auditing in the hands of the state legislatures, without the interference of corrupt governors, secretaries of state, or activist judges who overstep their constitutional roles.
As lawsuits need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis and since no one else can currently claim expertise on this matter, I am willing to aid courts or state legislatures which have not gerrymandered their maps in responding to lawsuits alleging that they have by providing amicus curiae briefs or advisory opinions. I will also create a districts map for any state which asks me to—even a Democrat state, because that is what fairness entails—free from gerrymandering and based on the same mathematical principles which I have used to produce the Ohio map.
In summary, knowledge of what gerrymandering actually entails and the identification of problem districts can help poll watchers decide where to focus their efforts. The groundwork is also laid for states unfairly accused of gerrymandering by Democrat activist groups in legal challenges to have such suits dismissed, as well as a US Supreme Court challenge to states which have already implemented constitutional amendments and gerrymandered maps due to judicial activism in the lower courts in support of the Democrats’ overall strategy to steal congressional seats.
References
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Paul Miller for Ohio 
